C2dialogueEnglish

The Difference the Outcome Makes

Outside a courthouse, Nina and Daniel shelter beneath an awning while the rain thickens. Nina: Legally defensible though the sentence may be, its philosophical rationale eludes me. Two drivers consult their phones for precisely the same interval; one kills a pedestrian, the other arrives home unscathed. We condemn the former as though contingency had disclosed some otherwise undetectable depravity. Daniel: What it has disclosed is a death—not a negligible distinction to whoever must identify the body. Abstract away the consequences, and the victim becomes an awkward remainder in your admirably symmetrical equation. Nina: I would abstract from them only when apportioning blame, not when determining compensation or supporting the bereaved. If desert concerns the culpability of a choice, how can it fluctuate with a stranger’s fortuitous decision to step off the pavement? Daniel: Why accord choice such exclusive jurisdiction? In acting, we implicate others in risks they never consented to bear. We are not disembodied intentions awaiting appraisal. Perhaps, having imposed a risk, we become answerable for its actualisation, however capriciously the world distributes it. Nina: Answerable, certainly; more blameworthy, not self-evidently. That distinction is precisely what your formulation elides. Were a faultlessly maintained pipe in my flat to burst and inundate yours, I should help restore your kitchen. You would hardly infer that I had thereby become a more reprehensible neighbour. Daniel: Your pipe, unlike the driver, exercised no discretion about its plumbing. She knowingly abdicated attention. Nor does distinguishing homicide from a near miss commit us to diagnosing a difference in character. Character need not exhaust the proper objects of moral judgement. Nina: Then specify what bears the additional censure. Not intention; that is identical. Not the degree of negligence, which we have stipulated is identical. Strip away those candidates, and what remains seems to be misfortune retrospectively invested with moral significance: punishment laundering its intuitions through the language of desert. Daniel: Suppose the driver who killed someone sought your counsel. Would you prescribe exactly the remorse appropriate to her fortunate counterpart—a chastened recognition of recklessness, a resolve to reform—and regard anything beyond it as philosophical confusion? Nina: Certainly not. Her grief has a particular object: someone died through her agency. But grief and guilt are not commensurable quantities. A blameless train driver may be devastated when someone jumps onto the tracks; the devastation neither establishes culpability nor supplies its measure. Daniel: Granted. Nevertheless, a theory that relegates her most profound response to a philosophical footnote troubles me. ‘I did this’ acknowledges something that ‘Others behaved no better and escaped the consequences’ leaves unsaid. True though the latter proposition is, it can function as an alibi without actually being false. Nina: Unless you are smuggling a verdict into the acknowledgement. Had the pedestrian in the other case stepped out a second earlier, your comparative judgement would reverse, although neither driver’s deliberation would have altered. Must morality really take its bearings from so arbitrary a counterfactual? Daniel: It must at least inhabit the world that occurred, rather than an antiseptic collection of possible worlds. To insist that she confront this death is not necessarily to pronounce her intrinsically worse. Perhaps the demand is relational: there is now someone to whose family she owes an account that the other driver cannot owe. Nina: Then our disagreement may concern the scope of acknowledgement rather than the distribution of blame. She must not invoke equality of recklessness to efface the particular death; equally, we must not transmute that death into evidence of inferior moral worth. Daniel: Equal censure for their recklessness, then, but unequal obligations in its aftermath? Nina: Provided the latter are not surreptitiously converted into the former. Luck may determine what reparation we owe without becoming the final arbiter of what punishment we deserve. Daniel: Less consoling than one sovereign principle. Nina: Only if consolation is what principles are for.

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Answer the questions

1. What is the central philosophical issue explored in the conversation?

2. Why does Nina introduce the example of a burst pipe?

3. What does Daniel suggest about judging the two drivers?

4. Why does Daniel describe the comparison with fortunate drivers as potentially evasive?

5. What does “stipulated” mean in the text?

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